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Abstract—Efficiently accommodating uncertain renewable re-
sources in wholesale electricity markets is among the foremost
priorities of market regulators in the US, UK and EU nations.
However, existing deterministic market designs fail to internalize
the uncertainty and their scenario-based stochastic extensions are
limited in their ability to simultaneously maximize social welfare
and guarantee non-confiscatory market outcomes in expectation
and per each scenario. This paper proposes a chance-constrained
stochastic market design, which is capable of producing a
robust competitive equilibrium and internalizing uncertainty of
the renewable resources in the price formation process. The
equilibrium and resulting prices are obtained for different uncer-
tainty assumptions, which requires using either linear (restrictive
assumptions) or second-order conic (more general assumptions)
duality in the price formation process. The usefulness of the
proposed stochastic market design is demonstrated via the case
study carried out on the 8-zone ISO New England testbed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the restructuring of the power sector in the US
and many European nations, wholesale electricity markets
have become instrumental for unleashing competitive forces
that, at least theoretically, should encourage efficiency im-
provements among electricity suppliers and eventually reduce
the cost of electricity for consumers. For example, PJM reports
that their market has annually saved up to $2.3 billion and
reduced wholesale electricity prices by 40% in 2008-2017,
[1]. However, there is a growing concern that the ability
of existing electricity market designs to continue delivering
these benefits will drastically diminish, as the current trend to
massively deploy large-scale renewable resources continues.
This concern is mainly attributed to the uncertainty and limited
controllability of the renewable resources, as well as their zero
or near-zero production costs, which tend to distort market
outcomes by dispatching thermal generators in an out-of-merit
order [2], [3]. Therefore, as penetration rates of renewable
resources increase, the US Department of Energy emphasizes
the need for ‘market structures such as ancillary services, bal-
ancing markets and energy markets maintain their competitive
frameworks [...] as resource mixes change to assure that the
market rules are providing the appropriate signals to bring
forth both long-term and short-term electricity supplies’, [4].
This need has paved the way for new market mechanisms,
commonly referred to as stochastic market designs, that are
capable of holistically modeling probabilistic characteristics
of renewable resources, e.g., by means of scenario-based
stochastic programming. To a large extent, these mechanisms
are enabled by the seminal work of Papavasiliou and Oren,
[5], which demonstrated the economic savings of scenario-
based stochastic programming attained from reducing overly
conservative deterministic reserve margins, [5]. Thus, instead
of using conservative, exogenously set margins (e.g., (3 + 5)-
rule as in [5]), uncertain and variable outputs of renewable
resources can be represented via a set of scenarios and their
corresponding probabilities. This leads to a lower expected
and ex-post operating cost and, under the assumption of
inflexible demand, maximizes the social welfare. While this
welfare-maximization is a desired property of any market
design, existing stochastic market designs struggle to achieve
it simultaneously with two other desired properties – revenue
adequacy, i.e., the payments collected by the market from
consumers are greater or equal to the payments made by
the market to producers, and cost recovery, i.e., the payment
to each producer is greater or equal to its operating cost1.
Furthermore, in the specific case of scenario-based stochastic
programming, achieving revenue adequacy and cost recovery
is difficult since it must be done for both the expected case
and each scenario individually. For instance, Pritchard et al.
[6], Morales et al. [7] and Wong et al. [8] demonstrated that
revenue adequacy and cost recovery are satisfied in expec-
tation, but do not necessarily hold for individual scenarios.
Kazempour et al. [9] and Ruiz et al. [10] simulated a stochastic
electricity market using stochastic equilibrium problems to
simultaneously ensure cost recovery and revenue adequacy per
scenario and in expectation. However, the market designs in
[9], [10] do not guarantee social welfare maximization and,
therefore, are intended by the authors for market analyses
rather than market-clearing tools. As discussed in [9], a lack of
cost recovery and revenue adequacy guarantees inhibits imple-
menting scenario-based stochastic market designs in practice.
As a result, rare real-world stochastic electricity markets are
limited to exogenous sizing of probabilistic security margins
(reserves) within otherwise deterministic market-clearing rou-
tines, e.g., in Swissgrid [11].
Instead of modeling uncertain outputs of renewable re-
sources by means of a set of scenarios as in [6]–[12],
one can exploit a chance-constrained approach to internalize
uncertainty of renewable resources in market-clearing tools
using statistical moments of the uncertainty (e.g., mean and
standard deviation). This approach leads to chance (proba-
bilistic) constraints that, in turn, can be exactly reformulated
into convex, deterministic expressions and solved efficiently
at scale, [13], [14]. Furthermore, these chance constraints
offer a high degree of modeling fidelity to control uncertainty
assumptions (e.g., probability distributions, [15], [16]) and risk
tolerance (e.g., the likelihood of constraint violations, [13]–
[15], [17]). Replacing a set of scenarios with its statistical
moments using chance constraints not only offers a more
accurate representation of uncertainty in market-clearing and
dispatch tools, see comparison in [14]–[16], but also eliminates
the need to trade-off between expected and per scenario
performance, while immunizing the resulting market outcomes
against uncertainty. That is, a stochastic solution is obtained at
the expense of solving a deterministic optimization problem,
which internalizes statistical moments and risk parameters in
the price formation process.
1Current deterministic US markets are also not revenue-adequate, but use
out-of-market corrections and uplift payments to retain market participants.
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2This paper proposes an alternative stochastic market design
that uses chance constraints to accurately model uncertainty of
renewable resources. Relative to scenarios, which are often dif-
ficult to obtain, the chance constraints can be formulated using
statistical moments of uncertain quantaties, which are readily
available from historical observations [16], and internalize this
uncertainty in market-clearing tools. To this end, we formulate
a two-stage chance-constrained unit commitment (CCUC)
problem that follows pool-market assumptions typical for US
wholesale electricity markets. Within this CCUC problem, we
consider three different assumptions on underlying uncertainty.
First, we assume that the uncertainty is represented by a
normal distribution. In this case, the CCUC problem is reduced
to a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) that can be used
for pricing electricity similarly to the current US practice
(e.g., as in [18]). Second, to better accommodate realistic
uncertainty, which is often not normally distributed [19], and
quadratic production costs of thermal generators, we formulate
distributionally robust chance constraints and approximate
them using the Chebyshev approximation, leading to a mixed-
integer second-order conic (MISOC) program. Third, since
the Chebyshev approximation is notoriously conservative, we
invoke an exact second-order conic (SOC) reformulation of
distributionally robust chance constraints from [20], which
also renders a MISOC program. The MISOC programs cannot
be directly applied for electricity pricing, which is currently
based on linear duality [18], and require using more general
SOC duality. This paper proves that the MISOC equivalents
of the CCUC problem yield a robust competitive equilibrium
and analyzes electricity prices obtained by means of SOC
duality. In addition to its superior computational performance
relative to scenario-based stochastic programming [14], using
the CCUC for electricity pricing is advantageous in several
aspects. First, the market-clearing procedure does not rely on
scenarios and produces the single set of market decisions.
Hence, market participants, who are currently distrustful of
a scenario-based stochastic market with scenario parameters
they do not control [9], will not be exposed to risk of losses.
Second, the prices obtained from the proposed market inter-
nalize uncertainty and risk parameters in the price formation
process, without trading off between expected and per scenario
performance. As a result, the proposed chance-constrained
market design enables real-world implementation of stochastic
electricity markets.
II. STOCHASTIC MARKET VIA CHANCE CONSTRAINTS
Following the current US practice, we formulate a two-
stage CCUC problem that optimizes the power production for
a single time instance in the future, where the only source of
uncertainty stems from wind power generation:
min
pi(ω),pi,αi,ui
Eω
∑
i∈I
[
C0,iui + C1,ipi(ω) + C2,ip
2
i (ω)
]
(1a)
pi(ω) = pi − αiω, ∀i ∈ I (1b)
Pω
[
uiP i ≤ pi(ω) ≤ P iui,∀i ∈ I
] ≥ 1− i (1c)∑
i∈I
pi(ω) +W + ω = D (1d)
∑
i∈I
αi = 1 (1e)
pi ≥ 0, 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, ui ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I, (1f)
where ui is a binary decision on the on/off status of control-
lable generator i from set I and pi(ω) is the power output
of this generator under uncertainty ω. Eq. (1a) minimizes
the expected operating cost given decisions ui and pi(ω)
and production cost of each controllable generator given by
coefficients C2,i, C1,i and C0,i. The output of generator i
under uncertainty is modeled using a proportional control law
in (1b), where pi is a scheduled power output and αi is a
reserve participation factor. The joint, two-sided chance con-
straint in (1c) ensures that pi(ω) is within the minimum (P i)
and maximum (P i) power output limits with the probability
given by (1 − i), where i > 0 is a small number that
represents the tolerance of the market to constraint violations.
We assume that wind producers are modeled as undispatchable
price-takers with the uncertain power outputs of W + ω,
where W is a given forecast and ω is its uncertainty. The
system-wide power balance is enforced in (1d), which balances
the total output of conventional and wind power generation
resources and demand (D). Eq. (1e) ensures the sufficiency
of reserve provided by controllable generators to cope with
uncertainty ω. The decision variables are declared in (1f).
Solving the CCUC in (1) depends on the treatment of (1c)
and the assumptions made on ω as discussed below.
1) Approximation by individual chance constraints: To
avoid dealing with the joint, two-sided chance constraint in
(1c), it is common to invoke two ad-hoc assumptions that
follow from power system practices. First, it is assumed
that violations on different generators are independent of one
another during normal (steady-state) power system operations.
Second, simultaneous violations of the minimum and max-
imum output limits on a given conventional generator are
impossible. As a result, (1c) can be approximated by the
following separate, one-sided chance constraints:
Pω
[
pi(ω) ≤ P iui
] ≥ 1− i, ∀i ∈ I (2a)
Pω
[
uiP i ≤ pi(ω)
] ≥ 1− i, ∀i ∈ I (2b)
Previous studies, e.g., [13], [17], [21], have shown that this
approximation limits the joint violation probability effectively
due to a few simultaneously active constraints. Further treat-
ment of (2) depends on the assumption made on uncertainty
ω. Since data-driven analyses in [16] show that ω can be
parameterized using a normal distribution, i.e., ω ∼ N(µ, σ2)
and µ is the mean forecast error and σ2 is its variance, which
reformulates the CCUC problem in (1) as:
min
pi,αi,ui
∑
i∈I
[
C0,iui + C1,i(pi − µαi)+
C2,i(p
2
i − 2µαipi + α2i (σ2 + µ2)
]
(3a)
P iui + σˆiαi ≤ pi ≤ P iui − σˆiαi, ∀i ∈ I (3b)∑
i∈I
pi = D −W (3c)∑
i∈I
αi = 1 (3d)
3pi ≥ 0, αi ≥ 0, ui ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I, (3e)
where σˆi = (Φ−1(1 − i)σ − µ) is a given parameter and
Φ−1(·) is the inverse cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution. While the constraints of (3) are
linear, the objective function in (3a) is quadratic, thus turning
(3) into a mixed-integer quadratic program (MIQP), which can
be solved by off-the-shelf solvers (e.g., Cplex, Gurobi).
2) Approximation by the Chebyshev inequality: While the
normal assumption on ω in (3) fares well in practice, e.g., [13],
[14], it introduces some inaccuracies as empirically measured
uncertainty does not follow this distribution exactly, e.g., [16],
[19]. To overcome this limitation, ω can be modeled using a
set of distributions, rather than a single distribution as in (3):
Ω =
{
P : EP[ω] = µ,EP[ω2] = σ2
}
, (4)
where uncertainty set Ω encapsulates all probability measures
with given first- and second-order moments EP[ω] and EP[ω2].
Assuming ω∈Ω makes it possible to recast (1c) as distribu-
tionally robust chance constraints, [20], [22], [23]:
inf
Pω∈Ω
Pω
[
pi(ω) ≤ P iui
] ≥ 1− i, ∀i ∈ I (5a)
inf
Pω∈Ω
Pω
[
uiP i ≤ pi(ω)
] ≥ 1− i, ∀i ∈ I. (5b)
Applying the Chebyshev inequality to (5) as described in [20],
[22], [23], the CCUC problem in (1) can be replaced with:
min
pi,αi,ui
∑
i∈I
[
C0,iui + C1,i(pi − µαi)+
C2,i(p
2
i − 2µαipi + α2i (σ2 + µ2)
]
(6a)
P iui + σ˜iαi ≤ pi ≤ P iui − σ˜iαi, ∀i ∈ I (6b)
Equations (3c)-(3e), (6c)
where σ˜i = (
√
1−i
i
σ−µ). Similarly to (3), (6) is a MIQP that
can be solved efficiently with off-the-shelf solvers. Although
adjusting parameter σ˜i allows for better fitting of empirical
data on uncertainty ω, the accuracy of the Chebyshev ap-
proximation reduces when i → 0 and its solution becomes
unnecessarily conservative or may even be infeasible, [20].
Note that i in (6) can be chosen such that σ˜i = σˆi, i.e., (3)
and (6) yield identical solutions.
3) Exact SOC reformulation: Motivated by the conser-
vatism of the Chebyshev approximation in (6), Xie and Ahmed
[20] derive an SOC equivalent of (1c). Using [20, Theorem
2], the CCUC problem in (1) is equivalent to:
min
pi,αi,ui,yi,pii
∑
i∈I
[
C0,iui + C1,i(pi − µαi)+
C2,i(p
2
i − 2µαipi + α2i (σ2 + µ2)
]
(7a)
pi − yi − pii ≤ P i + P
2
ui, ∀i ∈ I (7b)
− pi − yi − pii ≤ −P i + P
2
ui, ∀i ∈ I (7c)
y2i + α
2
iσ
2 ≤ i
(
P i − P i
2
− pii
)2
, ∀i ∈ I (7d)∑
i∈I
pi = D −W (7e)
∑
i∈I
αi = 1 (7f)
pi≥0, 0≤αi≤1, yi≥0, 0≤pii≤ P i−P i
2
, ui∈{0, 1},∀i ∈ I,
(7g)
where yi and pii are auxiliary variables and (7b)-(7d) are exact
equivalents of (1c). Relative to the optimization in (3) and (6)
that only have linear constraints, the notable difference of (7)
is constraint (7d), which is a SOC constraint.
A. Pricing with Chance Constraints via LP duality
Motivated by the current practice of electricity markets to
use LP duality for obtaining electricity prices, [24] proposed to
reduce the MIQP in (3) to a linear program (LP) by invoking
two restrictive assumptions that µ = 0, i.e., ω ∼ N(0, σ2),
and C2,i = 0, which leads to the following MILP:
min
pi,αi,ui
∑
i∈I
[
C0,iui + C1,ipi
]
P iui + σˆiαi ≤ pi ≤ P iui − σˆiαi, ∀i ∈ I (8a)∑
i∈I
pi = D −W (8b)∑
i∈I
αi = 1 (8c)
pi ≥ 0, 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, ui ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I, (8d)
While this MILP cannot be used for pricing electricity directly
due to the presence of binary variables ui, which prevents
computing dual variables of binding constraints, it can be
converted into an equivalent LP problem, which can be used
for electricity pricing as proven in [18], [24]. First, (8) is
solved using a MILP solver (e.g., Cplex, Gurobi) to obtain the
optimal values of binary variables u∗i . Second, the following
LP equivalent of (8) is solved to obtain dual variables:
min
pi,αi,ui
∑
i∈I
[
C0,iui + C1,ipi
]
(9a)
(µ
i
, µi) : P iui + σˆiαi ≤ pi ≤ P iui − σˆiαi, ∀i ∈ I (9b)
(λ) :
∑
i∈I
pi = D −W (9c)
(χ) :
∑
i∈I
αi = 1 (9d)
(γi) : ui = u
∗
i (9e)
pi ≥ 0, 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ui ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I, (9f)
where variables ui are converted into real-valued variables
and (9e) sets the value of this variable to u∗i . Since (8) and
(9) yield the same optimal solution, as proven in [18], [24],
dual variables λ, χ, and γi of constraints (9c)-(9e) can be
leveraged for electricity pricing as follows:
Theorem 1. Let {p∗i , α∗i , u∗i ,∀i ∈ I} be an optimal solution
of (8) and let {λ∗, χ∗, {γ∗i ,∀i ∈ I}} be dual variables of (9).
Then {{p∗i , α∗i , u∗i , γ∗i ,∀i ∈ I}, λ∗, χ∗} constitutes a robust
competitive equilibrium, i.e.:
1) The market clears at
∑
i∈Ip
∗
i =D−W and
∑
i∈I α
∗
i = 1.
2) Each producer maximizes its profit under the payment of
Γi = λ
∗p∗i + χ
∗α∗i + γ
∗
i u
∗
i .
4Proof. See our previous work in [24].
In other words, Theorem 1 establishes that dual variables λ,
χ, and γ represent prices for energy, reserve, and commitment
allocations that attain the least-cost solution and support a
market equilibrium, i.e., no generator has any incentive to
deviate from the solution of (8). Similarly to the current
electricity markets, Theorem 1 entitles every generator to
receive the following three payments: (i) λ∗p∗i for the energy
produced, (ii) χ∗α∗i for the reserve provided, and (iii) γ
∗
i u
∗
i
for the commitment status.
We extend the results from [24] by demonstrating that prices
λ, χ, and γ internalize both uncertainty (µ, σ) and risk (i)
parameters. Consider the stationary conditions of (9):
∂L
∂pi
= C1,i + µi − µi − λ = 0, ∀i ∈ I (10a)
∂L
∂αi
= µiσˆi + µiσˆi − χ = 0, ∀i ∈ I (10b)
∂L
∂ui
= C0,i − µiP i + µiP i − γi = 0, ∀i ∈ I, (10c)
where L denotes the Lagrangian function of (9):
L =
∑
i∈I
[
C0,iui + C1,ipi + µi(pi − P iui + σˆiαi)
+ µ
i
(−pi + P iui + σˆiαi) + γi(u∗i − ui)
]
+ λ
(
D −W −
∑
i∈I
pi
)
+ χ
(
1−
∑
i∈I
αi
)
(11)
Using the stationary conditions in (10) and σˆi = (Φ−1(1−
i)σ − µ), prices λ, χ, and γ can be expressed as follows:
λ = C1,i + µi − µi, ∀i ∈ I (12a)
χ = (Φ−1(1− i)σ − µ)(µi + µi), ∀i ∈ I (12b)
γi = C0,i − P iµi + P iµi, ∀i ∈ I. (12c)
As per (12), reserve price χ explicitly depends on µ, σ and
i, while energy and commitment prices λ and γi depend on
these parameters implicitly via dual variables of inequality
constraints µ
i
and µi. Unlike the scenario-based stochastic
market designs in [6]–[9], [12], the prices in (12) incorporate
uncertainty and risk parameters without the need to consider
multiple scenarios and trading off among per scenario and
expected performance. Notably, if inequality constraints in
(9b) are not binding, i.e., µ
i
= µi = 0, these prices reduce to
λ = C1,i, χ = 0 and γi = C0,i that matches the prices of the
deterministic market design implemented based on [18].
Remark 1. The results in Theorem 1 and in (12) are obtained
for the optimization in (2) under the assumption that µ = 0 and
C2,i = 0. However, it can be extended to the distributionally
robust case in (6), if i in (6) is chosen such that σˆi = σ˜i.
Remark 2. Since Theorem 1 is obtained by reducing (1) to
a MILP and proved using the same procedure as in [18], this
market design inherits the same cost recovery and revenue ade-
quacy properties as the market design in [18] (which currently
underlies US markets), i.e., it requires uplift payments.
Theorem 1 is developed under the assumption that µ = 0
and C2,i = 0. While the effect of the first assumption on the
optimal solution can be mitigated by tuning parameters i, see
the discussion in [15], the second assumption is prohibitive
in terms of real-life applications as it does not allow fully
accounting for the expected operating cost, which is crucial
for any stochastic electricity market design.
B. Pricing with Chance Constraints via SOC duality
This sections deals with electricity pricing for distribution-
ally robust formulations based on the Chebyshev approxima-
tion in (6) and the exact SOC reformulation in (7) and assumes
C2,i > 0, which inhibits invoking LP duality.
To show that (6) and (7) can be used for electricity pricing,
we will follow the same procedure as in [18], [24]. We show
that the original mixed-integer problem in both cases can be
converted into a MISOC program and has an augmented and
continuous equivalent (i.e., when the binary decisions are fixed
to the optimal value). Second, we will prove that the dual
variables of the continuous equivalent are electricity prices and
support a robust competitive equilibrium defined as follows:
Definition 1. A robust competitive equilibrium for the
stochastic market defined by either (6) or (7) is a set of
prices {λ, χ, {γi,∀i ∈ I}} and a set of dispatch decisions
{pi, αi, ui,∀i ∈ I} that (i) clear the market, i.e.,
∑
i∈I pi =
D − W and ∑i∈I αi = 1, and (ii) maximize the profit of
individual generators.
1) Pricing under the Chebyshev approximation: Given
Definition 1, our hypothesis is that dispatch decisions
{pi, αi, ui,∀i ∈ I} will be obtained by solving the mixed-
integer optimization in (6) and respective prices will be given
by the dual solution of the following augmented equivalent:
Equation (6a)-(6c) (13a)
ui = u
∗
i , ∀i ∈ I (13b)
pi ≥ 0, 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ui ≤ 1,∀i ∈ I. (13c)
This hypothesis leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Let {p∗i , α∗i , u∗i ,∀i ∈ I} be an optimal solution
of (6) and let {λ∗, χ∗, {γ∗i ,∀i ∈ I}} be dual variables of
constraints (3d), (3e) and (13b) of the augmented equivalent
in (13). Then {{p∗i , α∗i , u∗i , γ∗i ,∀i ∈ I}, λ∗, χ∗, } is a robust
competitive equilibrium given by Definition 1, i.e.:
1) The market clears at
∑
i∈Ip
∗
i +W =D and
∑
i∈Iα
∗
i=1.
2) Each producer maximizes its profit under the payment of
Γi = λ
∗p∗i + χ
∗α∗i + γ
∗
i u
∗
i .
Proof. Consider (6). If it is feasible and solved to optimality,
optimal values p∗i and α
∗
i must satisfy equality constraints (3c)
and (3d). As a result, it follows that
∑
i∈Ip
∗
i +W = D and∑
i∈Iα
∗
i=1, i.e., the first postulate of Theorem 2 holds.
Proving the second postulate of Theorem 2 requires showing
that dual variables of the augmented optimization in (13)
represent and can be interpreted as marginal sensitivities of the
equivalent constraints in the mixed-integer optimization in (6).
This proof follows from [25, Proposition 1], which establishes
equivalence between the optimal solution of a given MIQP
problem and its augmented problem with relaxed integer
decision set to their optimal values. Hence, dual variables λ∗,
χ∗, and γ∗i of the augmented problem in (13) are sensitivities
of the equivalent constraints in (6).
Now we show that optimal values p∗i , α
∗
i , u
∗
i , λ
∗, χ∗, γ∗i
maximize the profit of each producer. To this end, we recast
5(13) as the following equivalent MISOC program using sub-
stitution xi = p2i and zi = α
2
i :
min
pi,αi,ui,xi,zi
∑
i∈I
[
C0,iui + C1,ipi + C2,i(xi + σ
2zi)
]
(14a)
(φi) : p
2
i ≤ xi, ∀i ∈ I (14b)
(ψi) : α
2
i ≤ zi, ∀i ∈ I (14c)
(µi) : pi ≤ P iui − σ˜iαi, ∀i ∈ I (14d)
(µ
i
) : − pi ≤ −P iui − σ˜iαi, ∀i ∈ I (14e)
(λ) :
∑
i∈I
pi = D −W (14f)
(χ) :
∑
i∈I
αi = 1 (14g)
(γi) : ui = u
∗
i , ∀i ∈ I (14h)
pi ≥ 0, αi ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ui ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I, (14i)
where xi and zi are auxiliary decision variables, (14b)
and (14c) are SOC constraints. Note that dual variables of
constraints in (14) are given in parenthesis.
In turn, the optimization in (14) can be reformulated as the
following equilibrium problem (as proven in Appendix A):{
max
pi,ui,αi,xi,zi
Πi (15a)
p2i ≤ xi (15b)
α2i ≤ zi (15c)
pi ≤ P iui − σ˜iαi (15d)
− pi ≤ −P iui − σ˜iαi (15e)
ui = u
∗
i ,
}
, ∀i ∈ I (15f){∑
i∈I
pi = D −W, (15g)
∑
i∈I
αi = 1,
}
, (15h)
where (15a)-(15f) is solved by each producer individually and
(15g)-(15h) is solved by the market. Note that the objective
function of each producer given by (15a) is profit-maximizing
and is formulated based on Definition 1 as Πi =
(
λpi+χαi+
γiui−C0,iui−C1,ipi−C2,i(xi+σ2zi)
)
. Each producer solves
its optimization given by (15a)-(15e) and obtains optimal
decisions p′i, α
′
i, u
′
i that must satisfy the market problem in
(15g)-(15h), i.e.,
∑
i∈I p
′
i+W = D and
∑
i∈I α
′
i = 1, which
return prices λ′ and χ′. Under this equilibrium solution, the
profit of each producer is maximized, due to the objective
function in (15a), and can be computed as Π′i =
(
λ′p′i +
χ′α′i + γ
′
iu
′
i − C0,iu′i − C1,ip′i − C2,i(p′i)2 − C2,iσ2(α′i)2
)
.
Since the equilibrium problem in (15) is equivalent to (14),
as proven in Appendix A, and (14) is equivalent to the original
optimization in (6), as per [25, Proposition 1], their optimal
solutions are equal. Hence, we note λ∗ = λ′, χ∗ = χ′, γ∗i =
γ′i, p
∗
i = p
′
i, α
∗
i = α
′
i, and u
∗
i = u
′
i. This leads to Π
∗
i = Π
′
i.
Since Π′i is maximized by the optimization in (15a)-(15f), so
is Π∗i . Thus, {p∗i , α∗i , u∗i , λ∗, χ∗, γ∗i } ensures that the second
postulate of Theorem 2 holds.
While semantically similar to Theorem 1, the result of
Theorem 2 is a generalization of Theorem 1 that leverages
SOC duality for electricity pricing and allows for more
accurate market prices and dispatch allocations due to (i)
modeling distributionally robust chance constraints in (14) (the
assumption of ω ∼ N(0, σ2) used in Theorem 1 is no longer
required) and (ii) considering quadratic production costs since
C2,i > 0. Accordingly, using Theorem 2, we can obtain
explicit expressions for energy, reserve and commitment prices
by using stationary conditions of (14) given in Appendix A.
Indeed, re-arranging terms in (25a)-(25c) leads to:
λ = C1,i + 2C2,ipi + µi − µi (16a)
χ = 2C2,iσ
2
i αi + µiσ˜i + µiσ˜i (16b)
γi = C0,i − µiP i + µiP i. (16c)
Expressing pi and αi from (16a) and (16b) as functions of
λ and χ and plugging these expressions into (14f) and (14g),
respectively, leads to the following expressions:
λ =
[
D −W +
∑
i∈I
C1,i + µi − µi
2C2,i
]
/
∑
i∈I
1
2C2,i
(16d)
χ =
[
1 +
∑
i∈I
(µi + µi)σ˜i
2C2,iσ2
]
/
∑
i∈I
1
2C2,iσ2
. (16e)
Similarly to (12), λ and γi in (16c) and (16d) do not depend on
uncertainty and risks parameters, while χ in (16e) internalizes
these parameters via σ˜i.
2) Pricing under the exact SOC reformulation: Similarly to
(6), the optimization in (7) is a MISOC problem and, therefore,
we can follow the same procedure as described in Section II-B
to show that (7) can yield a robust competitive equilibrium
as given by Definition 1. First, we define the continuous
equivalent of (7):
min
pi,αi,ui,yi,xi,zi,pii
∑
i∈I
[
C0,iui+C1,ipi+C2,i(xi+ziσ
2)
]
(17a)
(φi) : p
2
i ≤ xi, ∀i ∈ I (17b)
(ψi) : α
2
i ≤ zi, ∀i ∈ I (17c)
(ρi) : pi −
P i + P i
2
ui ≤ yi + pii, ∀i ∈ I (17d)
(ρ
i
) : − pi + P i + P i
2
ui ≤ yi + pii, ∀i ∈ I (17e)
(ρi) : y
2
i + α
2
iσ
2 ≤ i
(
P i − P i
2
− pii
)2
, ∀i ∈ I (17f)
(λ) :
∑
i∈I
pi = D −W (17g)
(χ) :
∑
i∈I
αi = 1 (17h)
(γi) : ui = u
∗
i (17i)
pi≥0, αi≥0, yi≥0, 0≤pii≤ P i−P i
2
, 0≤ui≤1,∀i ∈ I,
(17j)
where xi = p2i and zi = α
2
i are auxiliary variables, (17b)
and (17b) are auxiliary SOC constraints, and u∗i is the optimal
solution of (7) that can be obtained using off-the-shelf solvers.
6Using the original mixed-integer optimization in (7) and its
augmented SOC equivalent in (17), we prove:
Theorem 3. Let {p∗i , α∗i , u∗i ,∀i ∈ I} be an optimal solution
of (7) and let {λ∗, χ∗, {γ∗i ,∀i ∈ I}} be dual variables of
constraints (17g), (17h) and (17i) of the augmented SOC
equivalent in (17). Then {{p∗i , α∗i , u∗i , γ∗i ,∀i ∈ I}, λ∗, χ∗} is
a robust competitive equilibrium given by Definition (1), i.e.:
1) The market clears at
∑
i∈Ip
∗
i =D−W and
∑
i∈Iα
∗
i =1.
2) Each producer maximizes its profit under the payment of
Γi = λ
∗p∗i + χ
∗α∗i + γ
∗
i u
∗
i .
Proof. Note that (7) and (17) are MISOC and SOC problems,
and, thus, are similar to (6) and (14) in Theorem 2. There-
fore, Theorem 3 can be proven analogously to the proof of
Theorem 2. We omit the proof for brevity.
Using the equilibrium established by Theorem 3, we can
analyze the dependency of the resulting prices on uncertainty
and risk parameters. Consider the Lagrangian function of (17)
and recall that xi = p2i and zi = α
2
i :
L =
∑
i∈I
[
C0,iui+C1,ipi+C2,i(p
2
i +α
2
iσ
2)+ρi
(
pi−P i + P
2
ui
− yi − pii
)
+ρ
i
(P i + P i
2
ui − pi − yi − pii
)
+ρi
(
y2i + α
2
iσ
2
− i
(P i − P i
2
− pii
)2)
+γi(u
∗
i − ui)
]
+λ
(
D −W−
∑
i∈I
pi
)
+ χ
(
1−
∑
i∈I
αi
)
(18)
and obtain the following stationary conditions:
∂L
∂pi
= C1,i + 2C2,ipi + ρi − ρi − λ = 0 (19a)
∂L
∂αi
= 2C2,iσ
2αi + 2ρiσ
2αi − χ = 0. (19b)
∂L
∂ui
= C0,i +
P i + P i
2
(ρ
i
− ρi)− γi. (19c)
Expressing pi and αi from (19a) and (19b) as functions of λ
and χ, respectively, and using these expressions in (17g) and
(17h) leads to:
λ =
[
D −W −
∑
i∈I
(ρ
i
− ρi − C1,i)
2C2,i
]
/
∑
i∈I
1
2C2,i
(20a)
χ =
1∑
i∈I 1/(2C2,iσ2 + 2ρiσ2)
. (20b)
Using (19c), we obtain:
γi = C0,i +
P i + P i
2
(ρ
i
− ρi). (20c)
Note that similarly to the prices in (20a) and (20c), λ and
γi in (20a) and (20c) are independent of uncertainty and risk
parameters, while χ in (20b) internalizes σ.
C. Design Properties of the SOC-based Markets
The market outcomes obtained under Theorems 2 and 3 not
only internalize uncertainty and risk parameters in the price
formation process, but also are helpful in ensuring such market
design properties as cost recovery and revenue adequacy.
1) Cost recovery: Cost recovery implies that producers
recover their operating cost from market outcomes and can be
formalized as Πi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ I. In the case of the Chebyshev
approximation, the optimization solved by each producer in
(15a)-(15f) is convex. Hence, we invoke the strong duality
theorem for the optimal market outcomes:
Πi = γiu
∗
i . (21a)
At the optimum, (14) and (15) yield equivalent solutions (see
Appendix A). Therefore, we express γ∗i from (16c) and recast
(21a) as follows:
Π∗i = C0,iu
∗
i − µ∗iP iu∗i + µ∗iP iu∗i . (21b)
Since (14) is a minimization problem, µ∗i ≤ 0 and µ∗i ≤ 0.
Therefore, the first two terms of (21c) are always non-negative.
Since µ∗
i
≤ 0, the third term in (21c) and, thus, Π∗i can attain
negative values. However, there are two specific, but practical
cases to ensure that Π∗i ≥ 0. First, we can restrict γ∗i ≥ 0 to
avoid negative (confiscatory) commitment prices, as common
in real-life markets (see [26]). This will make all terms in
(21c) non-negative and guarantees Π∗i ≥ 0. Second, if the
market is convex, i.e., controllable generators have P i = 0
and pi ∈ [0, P i], the cost recovery is guaranteed:
Π∗i = C0,iu
∗
i − µ∗iP iu∗i ≥ 0, (21c)
since µ∗i ≤ 0. This is an important property of the proposed
SOC-based market design that allows for explicitly consid-
ering uncertainty and risk parameters in the price formation
process without compromising social welfare.
Analogously, in the case of the exact SOC reformulation,
(7) can be used to formulate an equilibrium problem similar
to (15). In this equilibrium problem, each producer is modeled
as {max Πi|{Eq. (17b) − (17f)}}. Hence, we can exploit the
strong duality property to obtain:
Π∗i = ρ
∗
i i
(P i − P i
2
)2
+ γ∗i u
∗
i . (21d)
Since ρ∗i ≤ 0, (P i − P i) ≥ 0, we can ensure that Π∗i ≥ 0
in (21d) similarly to (21c), i.e., either we restrict γ∗i ≥ 0 (see
[26]) or the market is convex and pi ∈
[
0, P i
]
.
Note that if no additional restriction is imposed on non-
negativity of dual variables µ∗
i
and γ∗i , one can compute the
uplift payment for each producer as Υ∗i = max
[
0,−Π∗i
]
.
2) Revenue adequacy: Revenue adequacy is needed to
ensure that the total payment from consumers collected by
the market operator covers the total payment to producers
made by the market operator. Since the stochastic market
designs in Theorems 2-3 are based on the same principles
as the currently practiced market design in [18], they are also
revenue-inadequate. Thus, the market revenue deficit (∆∗) is:
∆∗ = −min [0,∑
i∈I
Γ∗i + λ
∗W − λ∗D], (22a)
where the first two terms represent the payment to controllable
and wind power producers and the last term is the payment
collected from consumers. Recall that Theorems 2-3 define
7Γ∗i = λ
∗p∗i + χ
∗α∗i + γ
∗
i u
∗
i and establish that
∑
i∈I α
∗
i = 1
and
∑
i∈I p
∗
i = (D −W ). Hence, (22a) is recast as:
∆∗ = −min [0,−χ∗ −∑
i∈I
γ∗i u
∗
i
]
. (23a)
Since χ∗ ≥ 0, the sign of (23a) depends on γ∗i , which can
attain both negative and positive values. Hence, if ∆∗ ≥ 0
in (23a), this deficit must be additionally allocated among
consumers, e.g., as in [18]. However, similarly to the cost re-
covery properties discussed above, we can guarantee ∆∗ = 0,
i.e. the market is revenue-adequate, in the special cases of
non-confiscatory prices (γ∗i ≤ 0) and convex markets (pi ∈[
0, P i
]
). Indeed, if γ∗i ≥ 0, then (−χ∗ −
∑
i∈I γ
∗
i u
∗
i ) ≤ 0,
which leads to ∆∗ = 0. Similarly, if the market is convex
pi ∈ [0, P i], we obtain from (16c) and (20c) that γ∗i ≥ 0,
which results in (−χ∗ −∑i∈I γ∗i u∗i ) ≤ 0 and ∆∗ = 0.
3) Expected vs Per Scenario Performance: The cost re-
covery and revenue adequacy properties described above are
shown for expected quantities, i.e., the assumption is that∑
i∈I p
∗
i = D − W and
∑
i∈I α
∗
i = 1. However, since
these two constraints are always met, if the optimizations in
(6) and (7) are feasible, we can invoke [14, Lemma 2.1],
which ensures that the expected solution is equivalent to
the solution for every realization of uncertainty assumed on
random variable ω, e.g.,
∑
i∈I pi(ω) + W + ω = D. As
a result of this property, the market designs in Theorems 2-3
hold for both the expected case and every scenario drawn from
ω. Hence, unlike scenario-based stochastic programming [9],
the proposed market designs do not require trading-off market
outcomes among the expected and per scenario cases at the
expense of increasing the operating cost.
III. CASE STUDY
The case study is carried out on the 8-zone ISO New Eng-
land testbed, [27], [28], which includes 76 thermal generators
with a total installed capacity of roughly 30 GW and techno-
economic characteristics reported in [27]. It is assumed that
all nuclear power plants are committed (≈ 8 GW) to serve
base loads. The forecast wind power output (W ) is modeled
as described in [28] for three different penetration levels: 2%
(current), 10% and 20% of the total demand. We additionally
assume that σ = 0.2W and  = i,∀i ∈ I, i.e., the market
operator has a uniform tolerance to constraint violations.
Figure 1 compares the energy (λ∗) and reserve (χ∗) prices
obtained with the MIL model (Theorem 1), Chebyshev model
(Theorem 2), exact MISOC reformulation (Theorem 3) for
different values of . The effect of parameter  on the resulting
energy and reserve prices varies. Since the energy prices
in all three models do not explicitly depend on , in some
cases they remain constant for a wide range of values of
. Also, as the wind penetration rate increases, the energy
prices tend to decrease for the same value of , since more
wind power generation replaces controllable generators with a
relatively high production cost and the remaining controllable
generators are dispatched in an out-of-merit order. On the other
hand, as the value of  reduces, reserve prices monotonically
increase under all models and wind penetration rates, thus
reflecting a greater need in reserve to deal with the uncertainty
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Fig. 1. Energy (λ∗) and reserve (λ∗) prices for different values of .
and variability of wind power generation. In all simulations,
the Chebyshev model, which is based on a conservative
approximation of chance constraints, yields the greatest energy
prices, regardless of the value of  chosen. On the other
hand, the reserve prices under the Chebyshev approximation
is lower than under the exact MISOC reformulation, since the
Chebyshev’s conservative dispatch leads to a greater out-of-
merit order degree that results in a large amount of committed
headroom capacity available for providing reserves.
The trade-off between the energy and reserve prices ob-
tained with the Chebyshev approximation and exact MISOC
reformulation affects the revenue adequacy and cost recov-
ery of these models. Figure 2 compares the Chebyshev and
MISOC models for  = 0.0001, as it is the most conservative
solution among the results in Figure 1 and, therefore, is
expected to cause greatest out-of-merit order distortions. We
analyze the market performance of these models in terms of
their total operating cost (as defined by respective objective
functions), total payment made by the market to controllable
(
∑
i∈I Γ
∗
i ) and wind power (λ
∗W ) generators and the total
payment collected by the market from consumers (λ∗D).
Regardless of the wind penetration rate, the Chebyshev model
yields a more expensive solution due to its inherent conser-
vatism. Nevertheless, both the Chebyshev and exact MISOC
models yield such prices that the total payment
∑
i∈I Γ
∗
i is
sufficient to cover the total operating cost, as well as we also
manually checked that Γ∗i ≥ 0,∀i ∈ I, i.e., every controllable
generator attains a non-negative profit. In other words, the
market outcomes in Figure 1 lead to cost recovery for all
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the Chebyshev and MISOC models in terms of their
market design features.
8producers. As the wind penetration rate increases, we observe
that the payment made by the market to wind power generators
increases. Although the payment made to controllable genera-
tors reduces, the effect of zero-cost wind power generators
suppress electricity prices at higher wind penetration rates
(see Figure 1), which makes the market revenue-inadequate
(e.g., the market deficit ∆∗ > 0). This revenue inadequacy is
observed for the 10% and 20% penetration levels and causes
the relative mismatch between the total payment to producers
and the total payment from consumers equal to 0.4% and
5.1%, respectively.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper described an alternative approach to design a
stochastic wholesale electricity market that allows to inter-
nalize uncertainty of renewable generation resources and risk
tolerance of the system operator in the price formation process.
The resulting stochastic market design exploits SOC duality
to obtain a robust competitive equilibrium that has the cost
recovery and revenue adequacy properties similar to existing
deterministic markets. In the future, our work will focus on
the application of the proposed pricing theory to network-
and security-constrained stochastic market designs, which are
needed by current market practices.
APPENDIX A
EQUIVALENCE OF (14) AND (15)
We prove that (14) and (15) yield equivalent solutions.
Consider (14) and recall that xi = p2i and zi = α
2
i . The
Lagrange function of (14) is then given by:
L =
∑
i∈I
[
C0,iui + C1,ipi + C2,i(p
2
i + σ
2α2i ) + γi(u
∗
i − ui)
+ µi(pi − P iui + σ˜iαi) + µi(−pi + P iui + σ˜iαi)
]
+ λ
(
D −W −
∑
i∈I
pi
)
+ χ
(
1−
∑
i∈I
αi
)
(24a)
Using (24a), we obtain the KKT conditions of (14) :
∂L
∂pi
= C1,i + 2C2,ipi + µi − µi − λ = 0 (25a)
∂L
∂αi
= 2C2,iσ
2αi + µiσ˜i + µiσ˜i − χ = 0 (25b)
∂L
∂ui
= C0,i − γi − µiP i + µiP i = 0 (25c)∑
i∈I
pi = D −W (25d)∑
i∈I
αi = 1 (25e)
ui = u
∗
i (25f)
0 ≤ µi ⊥ (P iui − σ˜αi − pi) ≥ 0 (25g)
0 ≤ µ
i
⊥ (pi − P iui − σ˜αi) ≥ 0, (25h)
where (25a)-(25b) are the stationary conditions, (25d)-(25f)
are the primal feasibility conditions, and (25g)-(25h) are the
complementary slackness conditions. Note that (25a)-(25f)
match the KKT conditions of (15a)-(15f) and that (25g)-(25h)
match the KKT conditions of (15g)-(15h). Hence, (14) and
(15) are characterized by the same set of KKT conditions and,
thus, yield the equivalent solutions, [9], [29]. 
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